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The properties inherent in Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT), create new
opportunities for firms, and in particular small firms. The capability of these
technologies to modify production specifications quickly and accurately means that
firms can customise their products and attain economies of scope based on low
volume and low cost production.  While traditionally technology has been perceived
merely as a tool in implementing business strategy, AMT has the potential to directly
affect firm’s strategy choices.  To date however, empirical analysis to examine the
technology-strategy relationship has not been forthcoming. This paper addresses this
gap in the literature by synthesising current perspectives on the factors that determine
strategy choice and so, integrate technology into the analysis.
The paper finds that AMT is instrumental in strategy choice. Yet, AMT does not
behave uniformly, but instead the gains from lower-order technologies and their effect
on firm’s strategy will differ markedly from higher-order technologies.  In addition,
firm’s must have an environment that is conducive to the adoption of higher order
AMTs, otherwise this will lead to a narrowing of their business strategy and act as a
constraint on growth.  Alternatively, for firms pursuing a complex strategy, the
introduction of AMTs will improve their strategic position by increasing their
complexity and leading to flexibility gains in terms of business growth.THE ADOPTION OF ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY AND
STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY
1 Introduction
For many manufacturers whose plants and organisations were structured for
the mass production of standardised products this has produced a crisis due to the
“rigidity of long term and large scale fixed capital investments in mass production
systems that preclude much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in
invariant consumer markets” (Harvey 1989:168).  The challenge is to overcome these
rigidities through the truncation of product life cycles, the shortening of production
runs and the achievement of shorter lead times in both manufacturing and design (PA
Consulting group 1989).  The properties of advanced manufacturing technologies
(AMT) overcome the limitations of conventional technology in enabling small firms
to develop economies of scope based on low volume and low cost production.
Specifically, AMTs facilitate customisation and reduced lead times through the
production of  “variety, frequent design changeovers, and rapid processing of design
and market information” (Parthasarthy and Sethi 1992:101).
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) is broadly defined as “an
automated production system of people, machines and tools for the planning and
control of the production process, including the procurement of raw materials, parts
and components and the shipment and service of finished products” (Pennings
1987:198).  Computers are central to AMT in both storing and manipulating data.  In
general, AMT typically involves (a) a computer-aided design system (CAD) that
develops designs, displays them and stores them for future reference; (b) a computer-
aided manufacturing system (CAM) that translates CAD information for production
and further controls machine tools, material flow, and testing; (c) an automative
storage and retrieval system for delivery or pick up of parts between machines and
storage; and (d) a supervisory computer that integrates all of the above (CIM)
(Parthasarthy and Sethi 1992).
Despite evidence demonstrating the positive impact of AMT on business
performance (Bessant and Haywood, 1988; Ingersol Engineers, 1984; Ettlie, 1988;O’Toole, 1985; and Goldstein and Klein, 1987), considerable debate surrounds the
role of technology in businesses’ choice of market development strategy (Mauri and
Michaels, 1988).  From the perspective of the industrial organisation literature (eg.
Bain, 1972; Caves, 1980; Demsetz, 1973; Clarke, 1985) technology is seen as having
no impact on strategy choice with this being determined by market and industry
structure.  As Porter outlines, industry structure not only determines the rules of
competition but also the “strategies potentially available to the firm” (1980:3).
Similarly, Mintzberg (1979) suggests that decision making processes (or co-
ordinating mechanisms) within a firm should be attuned to the complexity of the
firm’s business environment.  In other words, firms operating in dynamic and fast
growing markets will face markedly different competitive forces to firms in mature
and stable markets.
An alternative perspective based on the resource based literature (Barney,
1991; Conner, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Dooley et al..,
1996 Castrogiovanni, 1991) stresses the centrality of firm’s internal resources in
determining strategy choice, with particular emphasis on the role of technology.
Skinner (1969, 1974, 1985), questioned the traditional view of technology in
implementing business strategy, and instead argued that technology and other
manufacturing competence’s had to be accounted for in strategy formulation to avoid
a mismatch between strategy and technology.  More recently, Parthasarthy and Sethi
(1992: 91) have called for “new conceptualisations that relate manufacturing
technology and business strategy in interactive terms.”
Despite various studies of the relationship between technology and strategy
(Goldhar and Jelinek, 1985; Hayes and Jaikumar, 1988; Meredith, 1987; and Nemetz
and Fry, 1988)
“empirical research that would validate the speculations that these studies make on the
strategy-technology linkage has not been forthcoming” (Parthasarthy and Sethi, 1992:
88). This paper represents a first step in addressing this deficiency in the debate by
empirically analysing the relationship between strategy and the use of AMT.  The
analysis is sensitive to both the industrial organisation and resource based
perspectives of strategy formulation and examines the strategy-technologyrelationship in the context of firm’s market and industry structure and internal
resource capabilities.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the
main conceptual framework and the hypotheses to be investigated.  Section 3 presents
the methodology adopted and describes the data sources. Section 4 then describes the
main empirical results considering first the extent to which firms strategic choices
differ and the characteristics of firms adopting different types of strategic complexity.
Through order probit regressions those factors that influence strategic complexity are
highlighted and the implications of these on firms’ behaviour examined. Section 5
then presents the key findings and conclusions arising from the paper.
2 Conceptual Framework
Without clarification the terms ‘corporate strategy’ or ‘strategy choice’ are
ambiguous in that it is not clear whether they refer to past, current or future strategy
nor indeed to formal written strategy or to implemented strategy. In this paper strategy
choice is measured by the implemented market behaviour of firms in the period 1995
to 1998.  Market behaviour is interpreted as a proxy for market positioning, which is a
measure of firm’s effectiveness and success in their markets (Macrae, 1991;
Wynarczyk et al., 1993; Storey et al. 1989; Birley and Westhead, 1990; and Siegel et
al., 1993). Hambrick suggests that market structure limitations, as characterised by the
product life cycle model, “limit the range of maximally feasible strategies, such as
that it simply is not true to say that all generic strategies are equally viable within an
industry (1983:702). De facto this implies that differences will exist in the technology
and strategy used by firms in different industries as each industry will be at a different
stage in the product life cycle. For example, firms operating in dynamic and fast
growing market environments will face markedly different competitive forces to firms
in mature and stable markets.
A considerable body of literature exists on the properties of markets at
different stages in their evolution.  For example, growing markets are typified by sales
growth, both in the industry or market and individual firms as they increase their
market share (Porter, 1980; Catry and Chevalier, 1974), high levels of new firm entry(Levitt, 1965) and product and process innovations (Patton, 1959).  In contrast,
mature or declining markets are characterised by market saturation that restricts
industry sales growth and limits the potential for increases in market share.
Miller et al. (1996) suggest that in the absence of market threats or resource
shortages, firms in a mature market environment will tend to simplify their strategic
repertoires and pursue increasingly focused or simple strategies (Miller, 1990; Miller
and Chen, 1993). Typically, such competitive strategies will focus on achieving
economies of scale (Staudt, Taylor and Bowersox, 1976) with limited product
differentiation and an augmented focus on pricing strategies (Levitt, 1965).  In
contrast, multi-dimensional or complex strategies may be more suited to more
dynamic markets and include high-risk strategies based on product and market
differentiation (Patton, 1959) and the search for super-normal profits (Buzzell, 1966,
Smallwood, 1973).
In what follows, a typology of business strategy is adopted that draws on the
framework proposed by Miller et al. (1996) and makes the distinction between simple
and complex business strategies to explore strategy choice and its relationship to the
market environment, internal firm characteristics and the adoption of AMT. The
complexity of firms’ business strategy is measured along two dimensions namely, the
percentage of firm’s sales attributable to new
i products introduced by the firm
between 1995 and 1998 and the percentage of sales due to products being sold into
new geographical markets over the same period
ii. Using these two dimensions, four
strategic options were available to the firms’ during the 1995 to 1998 period.  First, a
stationary strategy where no new products have been developed and no sales have
been made to new geographical markets.  Second, a simple strategy where new
products have been introduced to the market by the firm but no new geographical
markets for the sales have been developed.  Third, also a simple strategy where no
new products have been introduced by the firm but new geographical markets have
been developed; and fourth, a complex strategy combining both the introduction of
new products and the development of new geographical markets by the firm.
As previously suggested, the institutional organisation literature argues that
firms’ choice of strategy is largely determined by non-strategic market structure orindustry factors. From this perspective, market dynamics will determine firms’
strategy with variations in strategy only being evident between different markets.
Therefore, through time firms in the same market will eventually adopt the same
strategy, that is, existing differences will be eliminated as firm’s strategies converge.
Strategy in this context is formulated deliberately and sequentially, being determined
at senior management level and then implemented sequentially at lower levels of the
organisation through the available mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1979).  In this context,
technology is viewed as one of the mechanisms in implementing the preferred
strategy.  Hence we would expect that:
Hypothesis 1 – The complexity of firms’ business strategy
will vary systematically with the dynamism of the market
structure or industry in which the firms are operating
In contrast, resource-based perspectives argue that firms’ choice of strategy
will be driven by their internal capabilities. For example, firms with strongly
developed design and R&D capabilities may seek competitive advantage through
superior product quality (Porter, 1980).  Similarly, where there is ‘administrative
slack’ in a firm this may discourage the adoption of a focused and simple strategy by
allowing an organisation to pursue a wider variety of activities such as advertising,
R&D, engineering and training (Levinthal and March, 1981; March, 1981; Nelson and
Winter, 1982).  Yet, for small firms, limited managerial resources will constrain the
ability of firms to adopt complex, multi-dimensional strategies (Variyam and
Kraybill, 1993) with the background and attitudes of the owner-managers affecting
both the firm’s strategic capacity and attitude to risk taking (Wozniak, 1987).  As the
data analysis deals exclusively with small firms this suggests that:
Hypothesis 2 - Firms with a richer resource base will tend to
adopt more complex strategies.
Mauri and Michaels (1998) have attempted to synthesise the industrial
organisation perspective with the resource-based perspective on strategy formulation.
They conclude that while firms’ resource endowments may determine strategy
success, strategy choice is – as the industrial organisation literature suggests –restricted by market structure.  In terms of technology they suggest that “firms
competing in the same industry tend to develop homogeneous competitive strategies
for investing in technology and marketing resources”
In contrast to the industrial organisation perspective and the findings of Mauri and
Michaels (1998) Hill argues that the use of AMT by firms in mature markets, where
previously differentiation was not a feasible strategy, can “make learning effects
significant again” (1988:409).  AMT enables firms not only to improve their
performance but also to achieve economies of both scale and scope.  Based on this
argument, the dominance of market structure as a determinant of firms’ choice of
business strategy has been diminished through new technologies that increase firms’
strategic options. It follows that:
Hypothesis 3 – Firms’ adoption of AMT will stimulate
strategic complexity, irrespective of market structure
3 Methodology
The empirical analysis is based on data from the Competitive Analysis Model
(CAM) database.  CAM has been involved in providing benchmarking information to
small firms in Ireland since 1995 and to date, in conjunction with the Industrial
development agencies in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have worked
with over 1200 small firms.  Data used in this paper was derived from interviews
undertaken between 1998 and 1999 as part of the CAM benchmarking service.  All of
the firms used in the analysis were independently owned small firms with between 10
and 100 full-time employees, had been trading for at least four years and had been
identified as having significant growth potential.  To this end samples were
constructed with the assistance of the appropriate development agencies in Northern
Ireland (LEDU – the Local Enterprise Development Unit – and the IDB – Industrial
Development Board) and Enterprise Ireland (formerly Forbairt) in the Republic of
Ireland. Analysis in this paper is based on 383 firms, 310 (80.9 per cent) in Northern
Ireland and 73 (19.1 per cent) in the Republic of Ireland
iii.For the purposes of the benchmarking exercise information collected from the
firms included the following:
(a) full accounting information for the 1996 to 1998 period;
(b) company characteristics such as date established, number of employees and
primary product markets;
(c) owner-manager characteristics, for example, if the owner-manager was involved
at the formation of the firm, their current equity share, their willingness to share
ownership and power, their age, qualifications and previous work experience;
(d) product specific information including the nature of product innovation activity
and perceived product quality;
(e) market information including the destination of sales and details of their customer
and supplier base;
(f) human resource issues including the managerial team and employee specific
measures;
(g) technology usage including the age of capital equipment, capacity utilisation and
the adoption of both process and organisation Advanced Manufacturing Technologies
(AMT)     
(h) strategy choices  incorporating both strategic priorities and the means of achieving
their strategic goals.
The empirical analysis draws on this benchmarking information to determine
strategic complexity, internal characteristics and resources in the firm and the
adoption of AMT.  Information on the market structure in which the firms were
operating could not be determined through the questionnaire data and was therefore
assimilated through official economic data sources.
As the sample of firms spanned both Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland, industry information was collected separately for both areas.  Official
government publications
iv and comprehensive survey information
v provided
information on market sales growth 1993 to 1997, business expansion (sales growth)
1993 to 1997, increase in business market share 1993 to 1997, the level of product
innovation activity 1997 and the incidence of R&D activity 1997.  Given the diversity
of markets in each broad (2-digit) Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), all of the
above was collected at the 4-digit SIC level.4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Strategy choice
The framework for firms’ strategy choice or strategic complexity defined in
Section 2 distinguishes four possible strategies:
(i) changing nothing i.e. no product innovations P=0, and no market developments
M=0.
(ii) changing product portfolio only i.e. P>0 and M=0.
(iii) changing market portfolio only i.e. P=0 and M>0.
(iv) changing both the product and market portfolio ie. P>0 and M>0.
In terms of the distinctions made by Miller et al. (1996), (ii) and (iii) of these
strategic choices might be regarded as ‘simple’ one-dimensional strategies, with
option (iv) reflecting a more ‘complex’ multi-dimensional strategy.  On this basis it is
possible to divide firms in the sample into those pursuing each type of strategy over
the 1995 to 1998 period (Table 1).  What emerges is that for the sample of 383 firms,
no strategic option is dominant. 28.5 per cent of firms adopted a static strategy
between 1995 and 1998.  44.1 per cent of firms adopted a simple strategy, that is, 25.8
per cent of firms basing their simple strategy on a changing product portfolio and 18.2
per cent focusing on market development.  The remaining 27.4 per cent of firms
adopted a complex strategy with changes to both their product and market portfolios
over the 1995 to 1998 period.
The diversity of strategy choice between the firms refutes the argument by
Variyam and Kraybill (1993) that limited managerial resources in small firms would
constrain their ability to adopt complex strategies. Instead, over a quarter of small
firms had adopted complex strategies between 1995 and 1998.  Test statistics on the
distribution of firms in each of the categories (Table1) shows that the sample was not
evenly distributed between the different strategic options.  One reason for this may be
the characteristics of the firms.   The characteristics of firms adopting each type of
strategic option are outlined in Table 2.  These characteristics are sub-divided intofactors external to the firm, i.e. market indicators, internal characteristics and
resources of the firm and performance indicators over the 1995 to 1998 period.
In general, firms adopting more complex strategies tended to be operating in
industries with higher levels of innovation and R&D activity and expanding gross
output.  Output per business had however decreased over the 1993 to 1997 period for
those firms with more complex business strategies.  This is reflected in the change in
market share variable, with marginally lower increases in market share for these firms
with more complex business strategies.
Differences were also apparent in the internal characteristics and resources of
firms adopting different strategic options (Table 2).  Firms with more complex
strategies were, on average, younger and employed slightly fewer workers.  As
expected, new products and new markets accounted for a larger proportion of sales for
those firms with more complex strategies.  Larger proportions of firms in the complex
strategy grouping had adopted Management Information Systems (MIS) and
Management Accounting Systems (MAS).  Formal quality accreditation was also
more common among these firms with graduates occupying a larger proportion of the
workforce than otherwise found.  In addition the average age of capital in these plants
was also slightly younger.
Significant differences in performance were evident between the strategy
groups.  In particular, firms adopting more complex strategies had significantly higher
turnover and employment growth over the 1995 to 1998 period.  Significant
differences were less apparent for measures of profitability between the groups,
however the data suggests that firms pursuing more complex strategies were
sacrificing profit for growth.  Consequently, comparatively lower profitability and
higher investments in technology – as suggested by the lower average age of capital –
together explain the large differential between those firms with high strategic
complexity and other firms’ measure of return on assets.4.2 Determinants of Strategic Complexity
While information on the diversity of firms’ strategy choice and the
characteristics of firms making each of these choices is useful, the role of technology
and its relationship to strategy remains unexplored.  As outlined earlier, there are two
very clear perspectives on the role of technology in business strategy formulation.
The industrial organisation perspective argues that technology is merely a tool that
implements business strategy, with strategic choice being dictated by the market or
industry structure in which the firm is operating and then translated into the objectives
of the firm.  Once the strategic direction has been determined in the firm, technology
and other resources merely fulfil the strategic goals.  In contrast to this perspective,
resource-based writings argue that it is the internal resources available within a firm
that determine the success or otherwise of different strategic options. Even here,
technology represents only one determinant of strategy choice.
Based on existing work, therefore, it would be inaccurate to look solely at the
relationship of technology to strategy without allowing for the other factors that might
be influencing firms’ strategy choices.  In addition, the results from Table 2 suggest
that differences exist in the market structure, firm characteristics and internal
resources and performance between firms in each of the strategic complexity
groupings and for this reason it is important to include these factors in any analysis of
the technology-strategy link. To identify whether or not AMT is affecting strategic
complexity, an ordered probit model is used.  This model allows for ordering of the
dependent variable - strategic complexity - and differentiates between each of the
factors included in the model to estimate their influence on strategy choice.
In examining the role of AMT in strategy choice, AMT is sub-divided into
process-related technologies and organisation-related technologies.  Information on
whether or not firms were using a range of process and organisation AMT was
collected through the company interviews.  Process AMT comprised, computer
numerically controlled machine tools (CNC’s), Robotics, Automated Materials
Handling equipment (AMH), Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided
Production Management (CAM) and Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM).Organisation AMT comprised Quality Certification, Total Quality Management
(TQM), Quality Circles and Just-in-Time (JIT) production.
Limited financial resources in small firms may limit the adoption of each of
the process-related technologies.  For example, as CNC, CAD and to a lesser extent
CAM are technologies that can be dedicated to specific tasks, these can be introduced
incrementally into the firm.  In contrast CIM, is more difficult to implement, being
more costly and demanding a higher level of co-ordination between manufacturing
activities than would otherwise be necessary.
AMT adoption may therefore be a gradual process in small firms, and this is
illustrated by the percentage of firms in the sample having each of the process-related
AMT’s.  CAD was the most widely used AMT, being found in 47.9 per cent of firms.
42 per cent were using CAM and 28.9 per cent were using CNC’s.  AMH and robotic
equipment were less common among the firms, being present in only 20.7 per cent
and 6.2 per cent respectively.  As already stated, where CIM is used, this will lead to
the integration of existing activities with this having direct benefits for the firms.
“Integration shortens lead times, encourages design for manufacturability, and makes
feasible the production of small batches of customized goods.  At the same time
closer integration increases interdependence within and across organizational
subunits, … [and] encourages quick adjustment to variations in the workflow”
(Zammuto and O’Connor, 1992: 708).  The fact that only 15.6 per cent of firms were
using CIM has implications for the benefits that these firms could achieve from using
process-related AMT.  Where AMT’s are not integrated by CIM, the benefits will be
in the form of productivity improvements as opposed to flexibility gains (Jaikumar,
1986).
The incorporation of organisation-related AMT in the analysis builds on
research suggesting that process- and organisation-related AMT are intricately linked.
Zammuto and O’Connor (1992; 709-710) argue that “Plants having ‘lean’ production
systems – those in which the workers had broadly defined jobs that emphasized
quality and teamwork coupled with JIT manufacturing practices – were more
productive. … Broader jobs, enhanced communication, and decentralized decision
making increase the potential for the flexible use of AMTs, improving anorganization’s ability to respond quickly to changing product requirements and
market conditions”. This suggests that process-related AMTs provide the potential to
increase strategic complexity, but this will only be realised where the organisation’s
structure is conducive to changing manufacturing practices.
Starting with a broadly based exploratory analysis of the data, a group of 19
explanatory variables were identified, which were significant in determining firms’
strategic complexity.  Table 3 gives the results of ordered probit regressions of the
complexity of firms’ strategy between 1995 and 1998 on a range of market industry
structure indicators, firm characteristics and internal resources measures and process
AMT and organisation AMT indicators (Equation 1). To overcome problems of multi-
collinearity and to eliminate those factors that were less important in determining
strategic complexity, some more insignificant variables were dropped and the probit
models were re-estimated (Equations 2 and 3).  Each of the equations were significant
at the 1 per cent level using a Chi-square test, and the signs and significance of
individual variables proved robust to changes in specification.  The percentage of
predictions in each of the equations are similar and are consistent with other studies of
this type.
From the probit models it is clear that the level of strategic complexity
adopted by firms between 1995 and 1998 was greater for those firms in market sectors
(defined at a 4-digit SIC level) with higher levels of innovation activity. Increased
levels of product innovation is associated with growing and dynamic markets (Patton,
1959).  As markets grow there are significant opportunities for product innovations
either through modifications to existing products or the development of new products.
With these product changes new customers may be identified and therefore firms
adopt a complex strategy with changes to both their product and market portfolios.
Increased strategic complexity was also associated with declining market
share over the 1995 to 1998 period.  While declining market share is usually
associated with mature markets (Catry and Chevalier, 1974), Table 2 highlighted that
firms adopting more complex strategies were operating in faster growing markets.
Sales growth for firms in these markets however, was not increasing as fast as the
market rate of growth, and therefore firms’ market share over the period wasdeclining.  These firms were therefore operating in dynamic markets where the entry
of new firms was driving down their share of total sales.
Market influences, that is, innovation intensity and changes in firms’ market
share, demonstrate that in more dynamic markets firms will tend to adopt more
complex strategies.  This provides some support for Hypothesis 1 that strategic
complexity will increase with increased market dynamism.  This finding also supports
the proposition of Miller et al. (1996) that firms in mature markets will tend to
simplify their strategic repertoires and pursue increasingly focused or simple
strategies, while firms in more dynamic markets will adopt more complex strategies.
Further, these findings also support, in part, the industrial organisation perspective on
convergence of strategies in similar market structures.  In contrast to the industrial
organisation perspective however, Table 3 also demonstrates that other factors are
important in determining strategic complexity beyond that of market influences.
The resource based perspective on strategy formulation and complexity was
examined by incorporating a range of variables on the firms’ characteristics and
internal resources into the regression.  These included: performance measures of firm
growth, profitability and productivity; firm characteristics such as age and size;
market characteristics including the competitive pressures associated with customers,
labour, raw material supplies and finance, the barriers to entry into the market and the
location of the firm.  As entrepreneurial characteristics have been identified as central
to the success of small businesses (Wozniak, 1987; Barkham, 1992; Johnson, 1991;
Kinsella et al., 1993) a range of measures related to the entrepreneur were also
included in the model.  Lack of significance for most of these measures meant that
they were eliminated from equation 1. Of those remaining, the only significant
variable in determining strategic complexity was firm age, with younger firms tending
to have more complex strategies. These findings fail to support Hypothesis 2 and
instead, in conjunction with the findings in Table 2, suggest that while differences in
characteristics and internal resources may exist between firms adopting different
levels of strategic complexity, these are not important (with the exception of firm age)
in determining strategic choice.  Other research also suggests that firms’
characteristics and internal resources are less important in determining strategy choicethan in influencing the success of the chosen strategy (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper,
2000).
The incorporation of process-related and organisation-related AMT into the
regression created some interesting findings.  Initially 10 AMTs were included in the
regression, however, lack of significance associated with the adoption of robotic
equipment and quality circles led to their exclusion from the regression and a re-
estimation of the model
vi.  Computer Aided Design (CAD) was also excluded from
equation 2 due to its correlation with Computer Aided Production Manufacturing
(CAM)
vii. Similarly, quality certification and JIT production were also excluded from
the estimation of Equation 3 due to their strong correlation with TQM
viii. Re-
estimation of the model allowed the effects of each of the remaining AMTs on
strategic complexity to be seen more clearly (Equation 3).
Four of the AMTs were found to have a significant effect on firms’ strategic
complexity.  These included three process-related technologies, namely Computer
Numerically Controlled Machine Tools, Automated Materials Handling equipment,
Computer Integrated Manufacturing and one organisation-related technology, Total
Quality Management.  While it would be expected ex ante that the adoption of AMT
would be directly related to increased strategic complexity, this was not supported by
the results
ix. Indeed, the adoption of CNC’s, CAD (equation1) and CAM were related
to lower strategic complexity
x.  In contrast, the adoption of AMH equipment, CIM
and TQM were significantly associated with increased strategic complexity.
These findings emphasise the fact that AMT is an all-embracing term with
considerable diversity between its component technologies.  Hill (1988: 409)
proposed that the use of AMT enabled firms to “make learning effects significant
again” with this facilitating a strategy based on differentiation.  Yet, as already
outlined, the adoption of AMT is often an incremental process with lower order
technologies, such as CNC’s, CAD and CAM being introduced to firms as
independent technologies with immediate productivity benefits.  In contrast, AMH
and CIM technologies represent higher-order AMT that leads to integration of the
whole manufacturing process and flexibility gains throughout the organisation.Similarly, TQM represents an organisation AMT that also integrates subunits and
facilitates economies of scope and a broader strategy.
These findings lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 3, that firms’ adoption of
AMT will stimulate strategic complexity irrespective of their market structure. What
is found from the regressions is that, AMTs cannot be treated as an homogenous
group of technologies with uniform effects on strategic complexity.  In particular, the
adoption of CNC’s, CAD and CAM tend to reduce firms’ strategic complexity
xi.  In
contrast, the adoption of AMH and CIM, along with the organisation-related AMT of
TQM, stimulate greater strategic complexity among the firms.
The ordered probit model has highlighted some interesting relationships
between firms’ strategic complexity and market structure, firm characteristics and
internal resources, and in particular, the adoption of AMT.  It is only by taking this
analysis a step further, in determining the marginal effects of the ordered probit
model, that the actual effect of each factor can be identified.  Table 4 presents the
Marginal effects for Equation 3 of Table 3 and highlights the effect of each factor on
firms with different levels of strategic complexity.
From Table 3, the industry influence of innovation intensity suggested that
firms’ operating in sectors with higher levels of product innovation tended to adopt
more complex strategies.  The marginal effects (Table 4) illustrate however that as
innovation intensity increases firms with a static strategy or a simple strategy will
tend to simplify their strategies while firms with a complex strategy will enhance their
strategic complexity.  Increased levels of market innovation is therefore associated
with a divergence of strategic complexity with only those firms previously using
complex strategies capable of keeping pace with market trends.
In contrast to innovation intensity, increases in firm’s market share will lead to
a convergence of strategies between firms. While the literature suggests that firms
experiencing increases in their market share will typically be operating in dynamic
markets and adopting complex strategies, this was not supported by the data (Tables 2
and 3).  Instead, the results suggested that firms operating in growing markets were
experiencing relative decreases in their market share as the entry of new firms into themarket was diminishing their growth in sales compared to the market average.  For
these firms with complex strategies therefore, strategic complexity is used to
consolidate and increase market share with the resulting increases in market share
leading these firms to simplify their strategies.  In contrast, for those firms with a
static or simple strategy, increases in their market share will lead them to adopt more
complex business strategies.
Firm age was the only factor relating to the firm’s characteristics and internal
resources that had a significant impact on determining strategic complexity.  In
general, older firms tended to simplify their strategies.  Marginal effects data suggests
that as firm age increases, those firms that had previously adopted a static or simple
strategy will increase the complexity of their strategies.  In contrast, for those firms
that were previously adopting complex strategies, as they get older they will tend to
simplify their strategies.  Firm age therefore acts as a converging influence on
strategic complexity as firms with complex strategies reduce the level of complexity
and those with simple strategies increase their level of complexity.
The adoption of AMT also has a different effect on firms’ strategic
complexity, depending on their current strategic complexity.  Yet, again, AMTs
cannot be treated as an homogenous group with CNC’s behaving differently to AMH,
CIM and TQM.  The adoption of CNC’s is significant to those firms with static or
simple strategies in leading them to increase their level of strategic complexity.  In
contrast, the introduction of CNC’s to firms with complex strategies will act as a
simplifying influence on their strategies.  The adoption of CNC’s therefore lead to a
convergence of strategic complexity among firms with this being linked to the often
narrow application of CNC equipment.
AMH, CIM and TQM act to polarise the complexity of firms’ strategies.  For
example, for those firms with static or simple strategies the adoption of either of these
techniques will reduce their strategic complexity while for those firms with complex
strategies, the adoption of AMH, CIM or TQM will increase the level of strategic
complexity.  These ‘higher-order’ AMTs therefore, lead to a polarising of firm’s
strategic complexity.  As firm’s with greater complexity have higher levels of sales
and employee growth (Table 2), the implication of this is that the growth differentialbetween firms with complex strategies and those with simple or static strategies will
widen with the adoption of higher order AMTs.  While firm’s with complex strategies
were sacrificing profit for growth, it is likely that this would be a short-term
phenomena as the flexibility benefits of AMT would enhance the firms’ market
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that firms can customise their products and attain economies of scope based on low
volume and low cost production.  While traditionally technology has been perceived
merely as a tool in implementing business strategy, AMT has the potential to directly
affect firm’s strategy choices.  To date however, empirical analysis to examine the
technology-strategy relationship has not been forthcoming (Parthasarthy and Sethi,
1992). This paper has attempted to address this gap in the literature by synthesising
current perspectives on the factors that determine strategy choice and so, integrate
technology into the analysis. A typology of strategy choice was used based on the
simple-complex framework as proposed by Miller et al. (1996) and suggested that
firms in a growing and dynamic market environment would adopt multi-dimensional,
complex strategies while firms in a mature market would use simple strategies.
Based on a sample of 383 small firms, a number of key findings emerge from
the data and are now summarised. Small firms do not behave uniformly in their
strategic choices.  28.5 per cent of firms adopted a static strategy of no product or
market development between 1995 and 1998.  44.1 per cent adopted a simple strategy
of either changes to their product or market portfolios, while the remaining 27.4 per
cent of firms adopted a complex strategy of both product and market development.
Those firms adopting complex strategies tended to be in more dynamic markets, were
younger, employed slightly fewer people and had higher levels of sales and employee
growth over the 1995 to 1998 period.Through ordered probit regressions market structure was identified as having a
significant relationship with strategic complexity.  That is, firms in growing and
dynamic markets tended to adopt more complex business strategies.  Firm’s
characteristics, internal resources and factors specific to the entrepreneur were not
significantly related to strategic complexity.  The exception to this was firm age
where younger firms tended to adopt more complex strategies.
A significant relationship was found between the adoption of AMT and the
strategic complexity, however, this acted in different ways, depending on the specific
technology.  For example, two types of AMT were identified, lower-order
technologies such as CAD, CAM and CNC’s, and higher order technologies such as
AMH, CIM and TQM.  The lower-order AMTs can be introduced incrementally into
the production process and be dedicated to specific and narrow tasks with immediate
productivity gains. These technologies tend to be associated with lower levels of
strategic complexity. The higher-order AMTs demand the integration of
manufacturing sub-units and result in an increase in strategic complexity and the
attainment of competitive advantages based on flexibility gains.
Analysis was made of the marginal effects of each of those variables identified
as having a significant relationship with strategic complexity.  Again, differences
were found in the group of AMTs in terms of their impact on the complexity of firm’s
strategy.  The adoption of lower order technologies led to a convergence of strategic
complexity between firms, while the adoption of higher order technologies resulted in
a divergence of strategic complexity.  This suggests that the introduction of higher
order AMTs may widen the gap between firms, as firms with complex strategies
increase their strategic complexity and those with simple strategies simplify their
business strategies.  This has important implications given that firms with complex
strategies were growing at a significantly faster rate than those with simple strategies.
It can therefore be concluded that, while there is a significant relationship
between the strategy that a firm pursues and the market in which it is operating,
AMTs may also be instrumental in this relationship.  It must not be assumed,
however, that AMTs behave uniformly but instead the gains from lower-order
technologies and their effect on firm’s strategy will differ markedly from higher-ordertechnologies.  In addition, firm’s must have an environment that is conducive to the
adoption of higher order AMTs, otherwise this will lead to a narrowing of their
business strategy and act as a constraint on growth.  Alternatively, for firms pursuing
a complex strategy, the introduction of AMTs will improve their strategic position by
increasing their complexity and leading to flexibility gains in terms of business
growth.Table 1: Firms’ strategic choice
Product Development
0 1
109 (28.5%) 99 (25.8%) Market        0
Development
1
70 (18.2%) 105 (27.4%)
Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .124 with significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
c c
2 = 5.874 with significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 2: Firms’ Characteristics by Strategic Choice







Market Innovation Intensity 43.86 45.20 47.84
R&D in Plant Intensity 47.56 46.91 49.97
R&D Dept in Plant intensity 13.73 15.60 14.38
Change in gross output –
4-digit SIC level
** 142.10 139.55 152.25
Change in output per business 124.02 121.56 110.70
Change in market share *** 0.97 1.0 0.8
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Firm Age (yrs) *** 38.46 22.77 16.83
Number of Employees *** 35.44 46.00 30.47
New Products (% of sales) *** 0 15 34
Sales to New Geographical
Markets (% of sales)
*** 0.0 11.13 29.59
Concentration of Sales (%) 38 36 44
Number of competitors 18 42 38
Number of suppliers 81 76 43
Management Information
System (% of firms)
59.8 72.7 67.0
Management Accounting
System (% of firms)
67.9 81.0 82.2
Graduates (% of workforce) 4.83 16.72 19.19
Quality Accreditation (eg. ISO)
(% of firms)
35.8 38.3 39.0
Average age of capital (yrs) 5.99 4.87 4.66
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Turnover Growth (%pa) *** 6.31 13.23 36.97
Employment Growth (%pa) *** 2.18 10.82 15.82
Profit Margin (%) 6.82 6.69 -1.74
Return on Assets (%) 119.74 67.72 545.41
Asset to Turnover Ratio 27.70 24.32 47.91
Kruskal Wallis H Test for k-independent samples
* Correlation significant at 0.1 level
** Correlation significant at 0.05 level
*** Correlation significant at 0.01 levelTable 3: Strategic Complexity Equations and System Coefficients
Strategic Complexity
(Equation 1) (Equation 2) (Equation 3)
Industry Factors














































































































Constant 2.303 2.367 2.359
Number of observations 226 226 226
c
2 64.5 63.6 62.9
Log Likelihood -209.2 -209.6 -209.9
Restricted Log Likelihood -241.5 -241.4 -241.4
Correct Predictions (%) 53.5 52.6 52.6Table 4: Marginal Effects From Strategic Complexity Models
Dependent Variable –
              Strategic Complexity
No Strategic
Change
Simple Strategy Complex Strategy
Industry Factors
Innovation Intensity (mean %) -0.002 -0.000 0.002
Industry Output Growth 0.001 0.000 -0.001
Business Output Growth -0.001 -0.000 0.001
Average Firm Market Share 0.246 0.035 -0.281
Plant Specific Factors
Firm Age (yrs) 0.003 0.000 -0.004
Founder still involved with sig.
Equity
-0.059 -0.008 0.067
Sales Growth (%pa) -0.001 -0.000 0.001
Output per Employee (£000) 0.000 0.000 -0.001














Total Quality Management -0.197 -0.028 0.225




Market Innovation Intensity Defined as the percentage of total sales attributable to the sale of
new products, defined at a 4-digit SIC level
Industry Output Growth Defined as the average increase in sales output between 1993
and 1997 at the 4-digit SIC level
Business Output Growth Defined as the average increase in sales output between 1993
and 1997 at the 4-digit SIC level
Change in Firm’s Market Share Defined as the change in firm’s share of total sales output from
1993 to 1997 at the 4-digit SIC level
2. Firm Characteristics
and Internal Resources
Firm Age (yrs) The age of the firm in years in 1998.Founder still involved with
Significant Equity
A 0/1 dummy taking value 1 if the founder is still involved in the
firm and holds over 20 per cent of the equity, and 0 otherwise.
Sales Growth (% per annum) Defined as turnover (less any discounts given) deflated by the
national rate of producer price growth. The variable is defined as
the average real percentage change between 1996 and 1998.
Output per Employee (stg£000) Defined as the total sales per employee, 1998.
Power of Customers An intensity index ranging from 0 if customer power was




A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
CNC equipment, and 0 otherwise.
Robotics A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
robotic equipment, and 0 otherwise.
Automated Materials Handling A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
AMH equipment, and 0 otherwise.
Computer Aided Design A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
CAD systems, and 0 otherwise.
Computer Aided Production
Manufacturing
A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
CAM systems, and 0 otherwise.
Computer Integrated
Manufacturing
A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
CIM, and 0 otherwise.
4. Organisation
Technology
Quality Certification A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had acquired
formal quality certification, and 0 otherwise.
Total Quality Management A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted a
TQM philosophy, and 0 otherwise.
Quality Circles A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted
Quality Circles, and 0 otherwise.
Just-in-Time Production A 0/1 dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm had adopted a
JIT philosophy, and 0 otherwise.                                                       
Notes
i New products are defined as the proportion of total current sales comprised of products that have been
newly introduced to the firm between 1995 and 1998.
ii The percentage of sales in new markets is particularly salient in this analysis as Northern Ireland, and
Republic of Ireland firms have an over-dependence on the home market.
iii The sample bias towards Northern Ireland firms reflects primarily a greater level of encouragement
for firms to participate by the Northern development agencies.  See Barkham et al, (1996) for a survey
of the performance characteristics of Northern Ireland firms compared to some other UK regions, and
Gudgin et al (1995) for a survey of the relative performance of small businesses in Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland.
iv For Northern Ireland firms information on 4-digit sales growth, business growth and changing market
share from 1993 to 1997 was obtained from Office for National Statistics, Business Monitor PA1002,
Production and Construction Inquiries - Summary Volume, 1997.  Similar information for Republic of
Ireland firms was obtained from Statistical Bulletin 1999, Vol. LXXIV. No.4.
v Information on innovation and R&D activity across market sectors was obtained from the Product and
Process Development Survey, 1998 which was a representative sample of 752 Irish firms (Roper. S &
N. Hewitt-Dundas, (1998) “Innovation, Networks and The Diffusion of Manufacturing Best Practice,”
NIERC Report Series No. 14, NIERC, Belfast).
vi Only 6.2 per cent of the firms had adopted robotic equipment and 13.5 per cent having quality circles.
vii A Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .191 with significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) was found
between the adoption of CAD and CAM
viii A Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .154 with significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) was found
between the adoption of Quality Certification and TQM, with a coefficient of .415 and significance at
the 0.01 level (2-tailed) for JIT and TQM.
ix The rationale for this assumption is based on the inherent competencies of AMT to shorten
production runs, reduce lead times and facilitate economies of scope based on low volume and low
cost.
x It should be noted that of the relationship between these three technologies and strategic complexity
was only significant for the use of CNC’s.
xi It should be noted that this negative relationship between the adoption of AMT and strategic
complexity was only significant for CNC’s.
xii For a discussion of the relationship between capital investment and profitability and profitability and
market share, see Buzzell and Gale (1987).                                                                                                                                                              
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